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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its relatively brief history, Pakistan has been preoccupied 
with the difficult tasks of trying to insure its political and economic security as 
well as finding the proper means of providing a strong sense of national identity. 
Needless to say, a very important factor in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign 
policy has been India, which it has perceived not only as a military threat, but 
also as a diplomatic rival.1 Therefore, Pakistan has looked outside the region of 
South Asia for political support, and military and economic assistance. Yet, 
Pakistan has had its own internal problems that cannot be attributed to India (or 
to Afghanistan, with whom Pakistan's relations, at times, have been far from 
friendly). 
When Pakistan came into existence in 1947 with the partition of India, 
that state had no history of being a political or economic unit, while its 
inhabitants had no common language or uniform culture. Moreover, until 1971 
—when what was known as East Pakistan seceded and fully asserted its Bengali 
character through its establishment as the state of Bangladesh — Pakistan 
consisted of two wings separated by some 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even 
today, Pakistan is far from being unified; indeed, Shahid Javed Burki, a former 
Pakistani government official, aptly describes that country as "a nation in the 
making."2 Pakistan was created to serve as a territorial entity for the Muslim 
population of South Asia. (However, it should be noted that today more 
Muslims of the Indian subcontinent live outside its borders than within.) 
Interestingly, aside from Israel, it is the only country in recent history to be 
established solely on the basis of common religion. Thus, Pakistan's Islamic 
character has in the past and will continue in the future to be a factor in that 
country's domestic and foreign policies. With regard to Pakistani domestic 
politics, ethnicity is still a very important factor despite governmental attempts 
in the past to use Islam as a means to deny such distinctions within Pakistan.3 
Naturally, Pakistani foreign policy also has been greatly concerned with the 
preservation of national integrity. There has been a national consensus in two 
regards — the perceived threat of India and that Pakistan seek to promote 
friendly relations with countries in Asia and Africa, especially those with 
Muslim majorities. 
For the most part, it has been only in the last two decades that Pakistan 
has had great success in developing mutually beneficial relationships with other 
predominantly Muslim populated states, especially the Arab countries of the 
Middle East. (In both domestic and foreign policy, Islam is seen as an element 
of identity. However, in the domestic environment, Baluchis or Pathans may 
see it as a secondary factor given their ethnic groups' dissatisfaction with 
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Punjabi dominance in internal politics and the fact that they have brethren across 
the borders in Iran and/or Afghanistan.)4 While Pakistan did develop close ties 
with Turkey and Iran prior to the 1970s, during much of that time period these 
countries were members first in the Baghdad Pact and later, with Iraq's 
withdrawal from the organization in 1959, in the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO). These Western-sponsored alliances were regarded disfavorably by 
most of the Arab world, but by the mid-1960s, the newly created Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD) organization, designed to promote joint 
economic projects, had surpassed CENTO in importance. 
This article will review and analyze Pakistan's relations with the so-
called "northern-tier" states of Turkey and Iran as well as the countries of the 
Arab world over a thirty year period from the time of Pakistan's independence 
from Great Britain through the administration of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto — the 
architect of Pakistan's close ties with the Arab states of the Middle East that have 
continued to thrive well after his removal from power. Pakistani-Middle Eastern 
relations since 1977 are dealt with in order to assess the lasting impact of 
Bhutto's policy toward the region. This is the only area of foreign policy in 
which Bhutto's successor, Zia ul-Haq, maintained a similar outlook. 
The purpose of this article is to show how Pakistan was finally accepted 
by the Arab states, the core of the Muslim world, and to argue that these ties, 
while very important, do not alone answer Pakistan's needs in terms of security 
or identity. True security can only be achieved when Pakistan resolves its 
outstanding problems with India, among which the issue of Kashmir is most 
important.5 As for identity, only through the maintenance of democratic 
government can a consensus finally be built on what it means to be Pakistani.6 
Emphasis on the common faith of Pakistan's citizens is not enough to preserve 
national integrity due to the culturally diverse nature of the country. Yet, 
throughout the history of that states' existence, all of Pakistan's leaders have 
sought close relations with the Muslim world because such a policy has been 
popular domestically; in addition, they probably did so to serve as justification 
for their country's existence. 
The shape of Pakistan's Middle Eastern relations, in general, may be 
seen in the context of Pakistan's security concerns and the need to adapt to 
changing political and economic realities both in South Asia and the Middle 
East. In the early years of Pakistan's existence, that country was nonaligned as 
was India, but unlike its larger neighbor it did not receive much attention from 
the United States government. The Pakistanis tried to forge close ties with the 
Muslim world and used the United Nations to strongly support struggles for self-
determination in the region. When in the mid-1950s they had little to show for 
their efforts, Pakistan joined Turkey, Iran and Iraq in the Baghdad Pact, a US-
supported "northern-tier" alliance. (This was a practical arrangement that had 
nothing to do with Islamic identity on the part of Pakistan's partners as 
especially both the Turkish and Iranian leadership had been, over many years, 
promoting secularism in their respective countries.) During this time, the 
Americans provided the Pakistanis with a great deal of military and economic 
assistance. Pakistan's close ties to the US strained its relations with the Arab 
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world. Over time, the Pakistanis felt that they were being "taken for granted" 
by the Americans and were offended by the US's failure to provide support over 
Kashmir in 1965. 
As Sino-Indian and Pakistani-American relations declined—the former 
over a border dispute — Sino-Pakistani relations improved greatly. The China 
"card" gave Pakistan the opportunity to balance somewhat its relations with the 
other two superpowers. Also, Pakistan's new approach to foreign policy — i.e. 
a de- emphasis of its pro-Western posture in Middle Eastern politics — helped 
that country develop closer ties with the Muslim world, especially, at first, with 
Saudi Arabia who was interested in promoting Islamic unity. While the Muslim 
world supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan reciprocated with 
succor to the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. These relations became greatly 
important with the rise in oil prices following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 
Arabs used a part of their increased wealth to provide Pakistan with economic 
assistance, which included financing for arms. In return, the Pakistanis offered 
military know-how and manpower as well as civilian workers to those sparsely 
populated countries. 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to repair its 
relations with the US, which were strained under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and to 
strengthen its ties with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf; ties with Iran were 
generally cordial as Pakistan remained neutral in the Iran-Iraq War.7 During the 
1991 Gulf War, the Pakistani government maintained a military presence in 
Saudi Arabia but kept its distance from the US-led campaign against Iraq due to 
opposition at home, and anger over the American government's suspension of 
military and economic aid resulting from Pakistan's nuclear program.8 
THE FOUNDATION AND OBJECTIVES 
OF PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY 
In his inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, 
just three days before Pakistan achieved its independence, Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, who received the title of Quaid-i-Azam (The Great Leader),9 stated that 
one's "religion or caste or creed" had "nothing to do with the business of the 
state."10 Indeed, the Constituent Assembly chose to recognize Pakistan's non-
Muslim population — which at the time numbered about twenty percent of the 
country's total — by adding a white strip to the Muslim League's green party 
banner to serve as the new state's flag. ' ' Yet, there was no doubt that Pakistan's 
leaders saw the new state as a means of serving the interests of the Indian 
subcontinent's Muslims. In March 1949, in the midst of a massive exchange of 
population between India and Pakistan — that would result, according to the 
1951 census, in the latter having a ninety-five percent Muslim population — 
Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, declared the following in the 
Constituent Assembly: 
Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this Sub- Conti-
nent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the 
teaching and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demon-
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strate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many 
diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.'2 
However, it should be noted that the founding fathers of Pakistan were secular-
minded nationalists who based their ideas for the new state on Western political 
theory and logic. They wished to build the country into a constitutional 
democracy and in the process fit Islam into their design. They saw no 
contradiction in having an "Islamic state" with a polity operating according to 
the principles of modern democracy as "fairness, justice, compassion and 
honesty are all tenets of Islam."11 
Still Pakistan has had a difficult time over the years trying to maintain 
a constitutional democracy — it was under military rule 1958-71 and 1977-88 
—and to define a Pakistani identity. In an introductory note for the proceedings 
of the First Congress of the History and Culture of Pakistan—held in Islamabad 
in 1973 — the editor remarked: 
The mind of [the] Pakistani intellectual has often been agitated 
by a consideration of the question of our national identity .... 
What are the links that bind the people of Pakistan? What is the 
soul and personality of Pakistan? What is our national identity 
and our peculiar oneness which makes us a nation apart from 
other nations?14 
Pakistan's leaders concerned themselves with the problem of national identity 
in both domestic and foreign policy. However, it was the loss of what became 
Bangladesh that forced a re-examination of the issue and brought about a greater 
emphasis on Islam. On the domestic scene, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's administration 
granted a number of concessions to the Islamic establishment, among which was 
a decision to include, for the first time in Pakistan's history, a minister for 
religious affairs in the central cabinet. '5 ( At the same time, Bhutto had to use the 
military to quash a Baluchi rebellion following his decision to dismiss their 
elected regional government.)16 In addition, the 1973 constitution, in contrast 
to the constitutions of 1956 and 1962, which did not address foreign affairs, 
required that the state "shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal 
relations among the Muslim countries based on Islamic unity."17 However, 
despite Pakistan's changes in attitude concerning alignment with either the 
Western bloc or the Muslim world, its foreign policy has remained constant in 
terms of objectives. 
The first and foremost objective of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to 
preserve its national integrity. Indeed, it has never felt very comfortable with its 
South Asian neighbors, India and Afghanistan. Since independence, Pakistan 
and India have been involved in three wars — in 1948-49 and 1965 over 
Kashmir, and in 1971 over Bangladesh — and the dispute over Kashmir still 
lingers.18 In addition, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is still in 
dispute with the latter calling, from time to time, for the creation of the state of 
"Pukhtunistan" for the Pathans of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and 
part of Baluchistan while presently Pakistan continues to keep a wary eye on the 
ongoing civil strife next door.19 However, Pakistan's integrity cannot be 
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preserved solely through the realm of foreign policy. It has been bothered over 
the years by ethnic strife which has the potential to bring about its disintegration, 
as was the case with Bangladesh's separation. In what was prior to 1971 the 
western wing of the country, the Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis have also been 
resentful of the Punjabis and me Urdu-speaking refugees from India who have 
historically dominated the politics and/or economy of Pakistan. 
Another important objective of Pakistan's foreign policy remains its 
need to seek support for and improvement of its economy. It should be noted 
that the territories that constituted Pakistan were economically the poorest of 
what had been British India, and that they were dependent upon the industries 
of other areas of the subcontinent for basic consumer goods. While Pakistan 
possessed no known mineral resources it did have, however, two potential 
assets. Prior to independence the eastern areas of Bengal had produced the bulk 
of India's jute, while the western part of the Punjab, with an extensive system 
of irrigation, had annual surpluses of food.20 Since 1947, Pakistan's economy 
has grown considerably, yet as of 1983 its per capita income was only $390, 
which according to the World Bank classifies it as a low- income country.21 
These concerns of political and economic security were clearly on the minds of 
Liaquat Ali Khan and Pakistan's leadership in the early years as they are today 
with the current government. 
A third objective of Pakistan's foreign policy is best expressed in the 
words of Liaquat Ali Khan who in 1951 stated: 
To us in Pakistan nothing is dearer than the prospect of the 
strengthening of the world-wide Muslim brotherhood. Any 
endeavour, from whatever direction it is made, to bring the 
Muslims of far- flung countries together and to stimulate in them 
brotherly feelings of mutual affection, understanding and co-
operation readily finds an echo in the hearts of the Muslims of 
Pakistan.... [Indeed,] part of the mission which Pakistan has set 
before itself [is] to do everything in its power to promote closer 
fellowship and co- operation between Muslim countries.22 
Aside from Pakistan's need to establish its place in the world, it has had a 
genuine affinity with other Muslim populated territories seeking self-determi-
nation, given its past experience and its immediate concerns regarding Kashmir. 
As Jinnah pointed out in 1948: 
We are all passing through perilous times. The drama of power 
politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir 
should serve as an eye opener to us [in the Muslim world]. It is 
only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt 
in the councils of the world.23 
Twenty-six years later, in the keynote address to the Second Islamic Summit 
Conference in Lahore, the secular-minded Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
also called for Islamic unity: 
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There is no power without economic strength. Unless we 
reorientate our outlook and try to develop the potential to meet 
our basic economic and security needs through cooperative 
endeavour, we will continue to lack the inherent strength, the 
solidity, which is necessary for achieving our social, cultural and 
political purposes. 
Bhutto continued: 
The Muslim countries are now so placed as to be able to play a 
most constructive and rewarding role for cooperation among 
themselves and with other countries of the Third World. Not 
only are they possessed of a common heritage and outlook but 
also their economies are such as to enable them to supplement 
one another's development effort. It is time that we translate the 
sentiments of Islamic unity into concrete measures....24 
As can be seen, sentiment and necessity have shaped Pakistan's foreign policy 
objectives. 
PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR "BROTHERHOOD" 
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 
Pakistan's efforts in its early years to forge close ties with the other 
countries of the Muslim world were in some regards overzealous, for even 
Dawn, the Muslim League newspaper felt the need to assert in 1952: 
that the time has come for Pakistan's intelligentsia to realise that 
Pakistan is not adding to its prestige in the international field by 
running after certain other countries which are economically and 
otherwise in a far less stable position than Pakistan itself....25 
Indeed, the rector of Cairo's al-Azhar University "observed drily that too many 
Islamic conferences had been called in Pakistan" while Egypt's King Faruq was 
reported to have said in jest, "Don't you know that Islam was born on 14 August 
1947?"26 Pakistan hosted the first International Islamic Economic Conference 
in 1949, but the third meeting ofthat organization in 1954, also held in Karachi, 
turned out to be its last. The third and fourth sessions of the World Islamic 
Conference also met in, what was at the time, Pakistan's capital in 1949and 1951 
— having previously gathered in Mecca and Jerusalem in 1926 and 1931, 
respectively — but did not convene again until 1967.27 In addition, diere were 
two failed attempts during the early 1950s to organize in Pakistan a conference 
of governmental leaders from countries throughout the Muslim world. 
These attempts at fostering Islamic brotherhood were bound to fail, for 
other countries in the Muslim world did not share Pakistan's views regarding the 
relationship between religion and nationality. Instead, they generally saw 
political issues from perspectives of territorial or racial nationalism, or in terms 
of opposition to Western colonialism rather than along lines of Muslim versus 
non-Muslim. Therefore, India's calls for Afro- Asian solidarity had greater 
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appeal. Nevertheless, Pakistan played an important role, during its early years, 
especially in the United Nations, in its advocacy of the struggles for self-
determination in predominantly Muslim areas from North Africa to Southeast 
Asia. 
Few could speak so eloquently as Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah 
Khan on the issue of Palestine. Just one day before the United Nations' General 
Assembly adopted the proposal of the majority on the Special Committee on 
Palestine calling for the partition ofthat country (28 November 1947), Zafrullah 
Khan argued before the General Assembly that the Western powers were 
"forcibly driving ... a Western wedge into the heart of the Middle East" and 
warned them that they would have to face the consequences of their approval of 
the creation of Israel: "Remember... that you may need friends tomorrow, that 
you may need allies in the Middle East; I beg of you not to ruin and blast your 
credit in those lands."28 Following the General Assembly vote (of 33 to 13, with 
10 abstentions), in which Pakistan sided with the six Arab states, Turkey, Iran, 
Afghanistan, India, Greece and Cuba, Dawn denounced the decision which it 
viewed as supporting an "impolitic, immoral and illegal move to partition a 
small country without reference to and against the will of the overwhelming 
majority of its people." Moreover, the newspaper described the partition plan 
as a "diabolical conspiracy to sow the seeds of war in the Middle East."29 Indeed, 
as Zafrullah Khan pointed out to the General Assembly, in the midst of the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war: 
[A]t no time and under no circumstances would the East ever 
assimilate or reconcile itself to a sovereign State of Israel. With 
Jewry as such the East had no quarrel; it had indeed a deep 
sympathy with the sufferings of the Jewish race.... 
As for the specific question of partition, Pakistan's Foreign Minister 
asserted that his country ' s situation was quite different from that of Israel. After 
all, the Indian subcontinent was divided as a result of mutual consent and 
Pakistan was established in areas of South Asia where Muslims were in the 
majority. In the case of Palestine, however, Zafrullah Khan pointed out that 
Jews were in the minority in every sub-district except Jaffa; furthermore, (as he 
was to state in 1952) the United Nations' actions with regard to Israel repre-
sented "an imposed decision to take away... [a] country from a people who had 
inhabited a land for nearly 2,000 years and to hand it over to people who were 
coming from... outside...."30 While the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to be an 
important issue for the Pakistanis, there were a number of other territories 
throughout the Muslim world in which they took an active interest. 
When, in December 1948, the Netherlands attempted through military 
means to reassert colonial control over Indonesia, Zafrullah Khan strongly 
criticized diese actions while his government prohibited Dutch aircraft from 
landing in or overflying Pakistan.31 The following year, not only were the 
Netherlands and Indonesia able to reach an agreement with the help of the United 
Nations concerning die latter's independence, but the General Assembly also 
agreed to Libya becoming an independent state by January 1952, a cause for 
which Zafrullah Khan had worked hard to garner support. The Pakistani Foreign 
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Minister also firmly opposed Italian trusteeship over Somaliland; the General 
Assembly eventually placed Italy's former colony under the United Nations' 
trusteeship, an arrangement that was to last until 1960 when that territory 
received its independence. During the following decade Pakistan along with 
other Asian and African states expressed support for Tunisian, Moroccan and 
Algerian independence in discussions in the General Assembly.32 This was also 
a time when Pakistan strengthened its ties with Turkey and Iran and moved 
firmly into alliance with the Western powers. In the process, relations with much 
of the Arab world deteriorated. 
PAKISTAN, THE "NORTHERN-TIER" 
AND ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST 
By the early 1950s, Pakistan had little to show for its efforts in the 
direction of attempting to achieve Islamic unity. At the same time, aside from 
the Korean War boom, it faced continuing economic difficulties and had 
concerns about its military security. Ever since the establishment of Pakistan, 
its leaders had courted Washington for a strong commitment of military and 
economic assistance, but during the late 1940s the Truman administration was 
primarily concerned with developments in Europe and secondarily with those 
in the Middle East and East Asia. South Asia, on the other hand, "simply did not 
rank very high among American priorities during a time of heightened global 
tensions and escalating demands for limited American resources."33 Moreover, 
the Americans agreed with the British on the need for an evenhanded approach 
with regard to Pakistan and India so as not to jeopardize prospects for a peaceful 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute. 
However, by 1951 with nationalistic fervor on the increase in the Middle 
East in such places as Egypt and Iran over the issues of British troops based along 
the Suez Canal and ownership of oil resources, respectively, the United States 
began to view Pakistan as a strategic asset for the Western defense of the region. 
While they took note that Pakistan possessed "the greatest military potential in 
the Middle East next to Turkey," the British continued to have reservations 
about arming the Pakistanis. However, the British were in no position to 
dissuade the Americans when in 1953 the Eisenhower administration embraced 
the idea of a "northern-tier" regional alliance to include Turkey, (post-crisis) 
Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, as they favored a Middle Eastern defense pact in 
principle and did not wish to alienate the Pakistanis over this issue. Moreover, 
Pakistan's "clever combination" of public diplomacy, playing on the American 
government's aversion to nonalignment, and leaks to both the American and 
Pakistani press about plans for US-Pakistan military cooperation, designed to 
agitate the Indian government, served to hasten American plans to arm Paki-
stan.34 On 19 May 1954, the United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement according to which Pakistan was to be provided with 
military equipment and training for its armed forces. It should be noted that 
during the preceding month the Americans had signed a similar agreement with 
Iraq, and that Turkey and Pakistan had concluded a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation, a move which the Eisenhower administration had hoped would 
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serve as the first step on the road to the development of a regional defense 
organization. However, it was through a more forceful agreement calling for 
cooperation in security and defense between Turkey and Iraq on 24 February 
1955 that the "northern-tier" alliance, initially referred to as the Baghdad Pact, 
was launched. Great Britain became a member less than two months later and 
was followed by Pakistan in September and Iran in November of the same year. 
Like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in which Pakistan 
became a founding member in September 1954, the Baghdad Pact had no joint 
military command nor did it afford Pakistan protection in the event of war with 
India. 
Why then did Pakistan join these Western-sponsored pacts? Ayub 
Khan, who was the Pakistani army's commander-in-chief from 1951-58, offers 
the following explanation in his autobiography, regarding the Baghdad Pact: 
The Muslim world occupied an area which was vital strategi-
cally and economically and that was the reason why the United 
States and other western countries thought it worth their while to 
befriend the Muslims.... There was no reason why we should not 
have taken advantage of the opportunity. For us, our own needs 
for development were paramount.... 
Moreover, Ayub Khan acknowledges that a "major benefit" of joining the 
organization — which became known as CENTO with Iraq's withdrawal in 
1959 — was the "association and friendship" that developed with Pakistan's 
Muslim neighbors to the west, Turkey and Iran. As for SEATO, on the other 
hand, whose Third World membership also included the Philippines and 
Thailand — the other members were Australia, New Zealand, the US, Great 
Britain and France — Ayub Khan has this to say: 
I do not quite know the reasons that prompted the Government 
of Pakistan to join this Organization: one must really ask 
Chaudry Zafrullah Khan, who was then Foreign Minister. We 
soldiers were not consulted.... I thought at the time [we learnt of 
it] that Pakistan had no reason to join SEATO at all. Perhaps the 
main consideration was to oblige the United States, who had 
been giving us considerable economic help.35 
Ayub Khan continues in his autobiography: 
If anyone thought that membership of this Organization would 
in any way strengthen the position of the eastern part of Pakistan, 
then he was obviously overlooking die fact that the real danger 
to East Pakistan was from India which surrounded it on all 
sides.36 
In 1971, just four years after Ayub Khan wrote those words, East 
Pakistan — with the assistance of India — became Bangladesh. The loss of its 
eastern wing also formally ended Pakistan's membership in SEATO. However, 
in actuality, since the early 1960s — with Pakistan's growing ties with the 
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People's Republic of China, and its disappointment over the US's failure to offer 
support in its confrontation with India over Kashmir—that organization meant 
nothing to the Pakistanis. As for CENTO, Pakistan remained a member until 
1979, when due to the Iranian revolution, that organization ceased to exist. 
While by the mid- 1960s the alliance itself was superseded in importance to its 
members by its economic offshoot, the Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD) organization, earlier, during the mid- to late 1950s, Pakistan and its 
"northern-tier" allies had antagonized much of the Arab world. 
When, in early 1954, Pakistan and Turkey announced that they would 
make plans to cooperate in matters of defense, Egypt, which was in the process 
of negotiating for the removal of British troops from its soil, criticized such a 
move on Cairo radio calling it "a catastrophe for Islam ... the first stab in our 
back. The next one will probably occur when Iraq joins the plot."37 Iraq's 
signing of the Baghdad Pact a year later, as well as Great Britain's subsequent 
accession to the alliance, disturbed not only Egypt, but most other Arab 
countries as they saw it as an attempt by the West to divert their attention from 
Israel and to maintain British influence in the Middle East. Therefore, when 
Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, even Saudi Arabia, through its embassy in 
Karachi, called the move "a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states," 
while Radio Mecca lamented: "Is it... possible for any person to believe that an 
Islamic State as that of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands 
with Zionist Jews."38 (It should be noted that both Turkey and [alliance member 
to be] Iran had recognized the state of Israel in 1950—though the latter only de 
facto — and were in the process of expanding these ties.)39 A couple of months 
later, during a visit to India, King Saud "publicly certified that the fate of Indian 
Muslims was 'in safe hands.'"40 While Pakistani-Saudi relations had indeed 
reached a low point, they were better than those between Karachi and Cairo at 
the time of the Suez crisis of 1956. 
Pakistan's involvement in the Suez crisis is far too complex to do it 
justice in this article. However, the following interpretation of events is 
presented in order to explain Pakistani- Egyptian relations in the context of 
Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East in general, and to 
contrast it with those of India, its rival for influence in the region. In August 
1956, just one month after Egypt nationalized the Anglo- French Suez Canal 
Company, at the first London Conference of 22 countries called to consider the 
issue, Pakistan's minister of foreign affairs and Commonwealth relations, 
Hamidul Haq Choudhury, declared that "the sovereign right of Egypt in her 
dealing with a commercial concern within her own territory cannot be chal-
lenged or contested." However, just like 17 other countries including the US, 
Great Britain and France as well as Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, Pakistan favored 
international management of canal operations in cooperation with Egypt. India, 
on the other hand, preferred a "consultative body of user interests" that would 
not be able to exert any control over the canal; its proposal, which even the 
Egyptians disliked, had the support of Ceylon, Indonesia and the Soviet Union.41 
While Pakistan voiced its opposition to the Suez Canal User's Association 
established by the Western powers—a scheme which Egypt's president Gamal 
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Abd al-Nasser labeled an "association for waging war" — and its foreign 
minister, Firoz Khan Noon, declared: "we cannot... associate ourselves with the 
use of force or any solution imposed on Egypt against her will," relations 
between Cairo and Karachi remained at a low point.42 
According to Muhammad Heikal, Nasser's confidant, the Egyptian 
leader looked to Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru for advice and support. 
The two leaders who met each other initially a couple of months before the 
Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in April 1955, came to develop a 
personal friendship as well as a close working relationship in support of the 
cause of nonalignment.41 On the other hand, Nasser was distrustful of the 
Pakistani leadership and their almost unwavering support of the policies of the 
Western powers. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, however, "appreciated 
Pakistan's role and difficulties [given the Pakistani public's pro-Egyptian 
sentiment], and much preferred what was said and practised by Karachi... than 
the moralizings and pro-Nasser positions adopted, as he saw it, by India...."44 
When Great Britain, France and Israel went to war against Egypt in late 
October-early November 1956, Pakistan's Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy in 
"unreservedly condemning]" the action stated the following: 
These developments have created a very grave situation. Not 
only have these events incited and helped Israel in her aggressive 
designs on Egyptian territory, but the violation by these two 
Powers of Egyptian sovereignty and territory by the use of force, 
in disregard of the appeals of the other members of the United 
Nations, has shocked world opinion and placed the very concept 
of that world organization in jeopardy.... What is happening in 
Egypt today constitutes a threat to the entire Muslim world.45 
Suhrawardy's statement was moderate in tone as he had to consider relations 
with Great Britain both within the Baghdad Pact and the Commonwealth. 
India, which also belonged to the Commonwealth, was the only member 
of that body to send a formal protest to the British government, in which it 
referred to the Anglo-French bombing of Egypt as "being against all considera-
tions of humanity." Nehru, himself, also remarked "we are going back to the 
predatory method of the 18th and 19th centuries."46 Such words were more in 
line with the tone of the Pakistani press. Dawn, in an editorial of 1 November 
entitled "Hitler Reborn," declared that Great Britain and France "have suddenly 
turned the clock back hundreds of years, unwritten much of what has since been 
written in the book of human civilization, and decided to act as self-chartered 
libertines with the gun and the bomb, killing and conquering the weak like 
cowards."47 As for the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact, they 
issued a joint statement in Tehran on 8 November in which they "condemned the 
Israeli act of agression against Egypt," lamented the "regrettable armed inter-
vention of the British and French forces" and took credit for influencing the 
British decision to accept a ceasefire on 6 November.48 As was to be expected, 




When the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established 
and sent to Egypt to maintain the ceasefire and to assist in the execution of UN 
resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces, India sent a contingent 
of peacekeepers. Egypt, however, rejected Pakistani participation in UNEF. 
Suhrawardy reflecting on the Egyptian rejection stated the following to the 
Pakistani National Assembly in February 1957: 
When Egypt, which claims to be a champion of the Arab cause 
and the anti-Israeli cause, chooses to recognize and make friends 
with India and to have armies of India on its soil, the India which 
recognizes Israel, and has trade relations with it, and amicable 
relations with it, and refuses to allow Pakistani troops as a part 
of the United Nations [Emergency] Force, am I to consider that 
Israel is the pivot of Arab policy?49 
This, of course, was "sour grapes"; while India did recognize Israel in 1950, it 
never sent a diplomatic representative to the Jewish state, nor did Indian-Israeli 
trade amount to much.50 Moreover, Suhrawardy himself in a American 
television interview in July 1957 remarked that "the Arab states ought to 
recognize Israel and make peace with her" and that "Pakistan might eventually 
serve as a mediator."51 As a matter of fact, Zafrullah Khan had earlier served as 
a "channel of Egyptian-Israeli dialogue."52 In any event, it would take some time 
before Egypt and Pakistan could fully repair their strained relations. 
Following the Suez Crisis of 1956, the US announced what came to be 
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. It was a program for the Middle East 
designed to promote economic development and to provide military assistance, 
including the employment of American armed forces, "to secure and protect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such 
aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International 
Communism."53 Naturally, the members of the Baghdad Pact embraced the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, while Lebanon was the only Arab state (aside from Iraq) 
to formally endorse the program. When in 1958, the US intervened in Lebanon 
— where local Communists were not even a factor in that country's civil war, 
but instead it was alleged that the United Arab Republic (UAR, a union of Egypt 
and Syria) was involved — Pakistan, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement 
expressing their "appreciation and gratitude" for the "bold and appropriate 
decision."54 (It should be noted that on 14 July, just a day before the US landed 
troops in Lebanon, the Iraqi government was overthrown.) In contrast to the 
response of Pakistan and its allies, both India and the UAR condemned the 
American action.55 Yet with Iraq's subsequent withdrawal from the Baghdad 
Pact, Pakistan had a chance to improve its relations with the Arab world and to 
expand its ties with Turkey and Iran beyond matters of CENTO. 
41 
Summer 1992 
PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE THE 1960s 
In 1960, in an article in Foreign Affairs, Pakistani President Ayub Khan 
proudly declared the following: 
[I]n the context of present-day world politics Pakistan has 
openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West, and unlike 
several countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost 
completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the 
Communist bloc. We do not believe in hunting with the hound 
and running with the hare.56 
Yet, during the same year, the controversy surrounding the downing of the 
American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union — on a flight that may have 
originated in Pakistan without that government's knowledge—probably forced 
Pakistan to diversify its relations.57 By March 1961, it concluded an agreement 
with the Soviet Union in which it received a $30 million loan and technical 
assistance for oil exploration, while the following year, Pakistan began formal 
negotiations that led to a border agreement being reached with the People's 
Republic of China in 1963. Meanwhile, as a result of the Sino-Indian border war 
of 1962, the United States and Great Britain rushed to provide India with military 
aid. While the Pakistanis felt such assistance to be excessive, the United States 
was quite concerned about Pakistan's growing relations with the People's 
Republic of China, which also included a civil aviation agreement in 1963. At 
the time of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the US suspended arms deliveries to 
both India and Pakistan, a move that hurt the latter far more due to its total 
dependence on the US for military equipment and supplies. Naturally, the 
Pakistanis felt betrayed. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was foreign minister at the time, had this to say 
about the American embargo: 
America's reason for terminating military aid is to force both 
countries into confrontation with China. Indo-Pakistani coop-
eration is a necessary step towards a fixed objective, which is the 
encirclement of China. The United States being, badly bogged 
down in Vietnam, would like to give military assistance only to 
[Asian] countries willing to use that assistance in the Vietnam 
war and prepared to use it against China.58 
While relations between the US and Pakistan had reached a low point, things 
improved somewhat over the next decade with the Sino-American rapproche-
ment.59 On the other hand, as for the Muslim world, most states were quite 
supportive of Pakistan in its 1965 war with India. 
Indeed, Pakistan's image had changed due to its growing and/or im-
proved relations with the Soviet Union and China, and its leadership's greater 
appreciation of the motivations of neighboring states in the Middle East as well 
as those in the Third World in general. During its confrontation with India in 
1965, Pakistan not only received the strong support of Indonesia — whose 
leader Sukarno, an important figure in the nonaligned movement, had offered 
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military assistance — but also of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Iran 
reportedly supplied Pakistan with jet fuel and gasoline free of cost, while Turkey 
— which had earlier received Pakistani support with regard to Cyprus — 
serviced aircraft and provided guns and ammunition. Saudi Arabia and, to a 
much lesser degree, Jordan provided financial support. (At the same time, Egypt 
professed its neutrality.)60 Two years later, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, 
Pakistan was able to repay the favor of its Arab supporters and to show its 
solidarity with Egypt, by condemning Israel's actions as "naked aggression" 
and by offering "material help" to the frontline states.61 While relations with 
Egypt did not improve much until after Nasser's death in 1970, ties with Saudi 
Arabia strengthened during the late 1960s. 
In August 1967, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement for 
technical cooperation in the field of defense. This allowed for Pakistani military 
officers to be sent to the desert kingdom to oversee the development of Saudi 
Arabia's army and air force while Saudis were sent to Pakistan to receive 
military training. It should be noted that while initial Saudi contacts about the 
possibility of Pakistani help came as early as 1963, it was the American arms 
embargo against Pakistan and that country's need to find alternate sources of 
support as well as the "[impressive] Pakistani performance against a qualita-
tively and numerically superior Indian army" in 1965 that helped greatly to bring 
the two parties together.62 Of course, both countries hoped to develop relations 
beyond military ties. 
As early as 1965, Saudi Arabia broached the idea of what became the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), currently an association of about 
50 predominantly Muslim states promoting economic and cultural cooperation. 
In 1966, King Faisal visited a number of countries, including Pakistan, to garner 
support for his proposal of an Islamic pact, but received very little encourage-
ment. At the time, one knowledgeable observer explained the Pakistani position 
in the following manner: 
Pakistan has always been in favour of Muslim unity but is 
nevertheless wary of entering any new pacts in the Middle East 
since its unfortunate experience with the Arabs over the Bagh-
dad Pact. Now that a group of States [namely the UAR, Syria, 
Iraq and Algeria] is opposing the idea of the Islamic pact, 
Pakistan is all the more anxious to avoid involvement in Middle 
East [Arab] disputes.63 
Yet by 1969, following the burning of al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the 
short-lived Pakistani government of Yahya Khan attended the first summit 
meeting of the OIC in Rabat in which 25 countries, including Turkey, Iran and 
Egypt, were represented. The joint declaration concluding the conference 
announced the organization's strong support of the "Palestine people for the 
restitution of its usurped rights and in its struggle for national liberation."64 
During the Indo- Pakistani war of 1971, with the most notable exception of 
Egypt — which the Soviets used, possibly without Cairo's approval, as a base 
to airlift weapons to India — countries throughout the Muslim world sided with 
43 
Summer 1992 
Pakistan. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Iran reportedly transferred military 
equipment to Pakistan, including jets, while the last country also provided 
sanctuary for Pakistani commercial aircraft.65 As a result of the war, Bangladesh 
was established in what was formerly East Pakistan while Yahya Khan was 
forced to resign as president and to hand over power to his deputy prime minister, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 
In 1972, a few months after assuming the presidency of what was left of 
Pakistan, Bhutto stated the following concerning foreign policy: 
The severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly 
altered our geographic focus. This will naturally affect our 
geopolitical perspective. The geographical distance between us 
and the nations of South East Asia has grown .... [A]t the 
moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western 
Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie. 
Bhutto continued: 
There is a whole uninterrupted belt of Muslim nations, beginning 
with Iran and Afghanistan and culminating on the shores of the 
Atlantic and Morocco. With the people of all these states we 
share a cultural heritage, religious beliefs and a good deal of 
history. There is thus a community of interests which is further 
buttressed by the similarity of our aspirations and hopes. Clearly 
we have to make a major effort in building upon the fraternal ties 
that already bind us to the Muslim world.66 
Thus, Pakistan continued to play an active role in the OIC and to strongly support 
the Arab cause against Israel. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Pakistan sent 
medical teams to both Egypt and Syria, while in the latter country Pakistani 
pilots engaged in defensive actions.67 Furthermore, its minister for defense and 
foreign affairs, Aziz Ahmed, presented the following condemnation of Israel in 
the UN General Assembly: 
For almost six years the Arabs and the rest of the world have 
waited for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance 
with Resolution 242, adopted by the Security Council in Novem-
ber 1967. Every effort made since then to resolve the conflict has 
been frustrated by the intransigence of Israel.... Israel has put the 
world on notice that it has no intention whatsoever to part with 
the [occupied Arab] territory.... [Considering that all the 
peaceful avenues of settlement have been blocked, it is small 
wonder that the Arabs have taken up the challenge and decided 
to meet force with force.68 
Following the war, Pakistan hosted the second summit meeting of the 
OIC in Lahore in February 1974, at which 37 countries and the PLO were 
represented. (Syria and Iraq, which had boycotted the first summit in 1969 were 
in attendance, though the latter strictly as an observer.) The three-day confer-
ence afforded Pakistan the opportunity of recognizing Bangladesh, of increas-
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ing its stature in the Muslim world politically and of benefiting economically.69 
This latter concern was extremely important given the rising price of oil 
following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the fact that Pakistan produced 
domestically only about ten percent of its petroleum needs.70 
Before pursuing in more detail Pakistan's economic relations with the 
Middle East, which would increase greatly during the 1970s and beyond, it must 
be mentioned, that while Bhutto held true to Pakistan's long standing foreign 
policy objectives, he more fully developed the policy of "bilateralism" — i.e., 
good relations bilaterally with each of the three "superpowers"—that had been 
initiated by Ayub Khan. (However, it was not until 1979, after the demise of 
CENTO and under the rule of Zia ul-Haq—Bhutto's successor—that Pakistan 
joined the Nonaligned Movement.) At the same time, Bhutto stayed clear of 
disputes in the Muslim world and carried on a somewhat similar policy in the 
Middle East by maintaining close ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya: 
As he paid homage to Saudi Arabia for being the center of the 
Islamic world, and King Faisal as the keeper of the Faith, he 
cultivated the shah of Iran as an enlightened monarch and an old 
friend of Pakistan, and Libya's Colonel Qadaffi as a special 
person whose unannounced arrivals were always welcomed 
with a great deal of pomp and ceremony.71 
These relations would bear much fruit economically. From 1973 to 
1976, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and 
Qatar provided Pakistan with loans and credits worth $993 million, totaling 
almost one-third of all financial aid coming from foreign sources over the same 
time period.72 In addition, Pakistani exports to the Middle East increased 
dramatically. In 1970-71, before the loss of East Pakistan, exports to the region 
amounted to twelve per cent of total exports while in 1974-75 it was twenty-five 
per cent.73 In 1974-75, Saudi Arabia was the largest market in the Middle East 
in terms of monetary value for Pakistani agricultural and industrial exports, 
followed by Iran, the UAE, Iraq and Kuwait. For the same time period, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait (in that order) were far and away Pakistan's biggest suppliers 
of oil.74 In addition to trade, the exportation of civilian manpower to the Middle 
East began during the Bhutto administration while, as mentioned previously, the 
exportation of military personnel to the region started even earlier. Both have 
become important sources of foreign exchange and workers' remittances have 
provided substantial relief in covering trade imbalances caused by the rising cost 
of oil. 
By 1977, there were more than 300,000 Pakistanis working in the 
Middle East concentrated primarily in the Arab states bordering on the Persian 
Gulf and in Libya. In 1977-78, they brought in remittances totaling more than 
$1.1 billion (about twice the monetary amount of Pakistan's service on its 
foreign debt) and equaling seventy-nine percent of the deficit-on-trade ac-
count.75 By 1983, an International Labor Organization report estimated that 
there were 1.8 to 2.4 million Pakistanis working in the Middle East with fifty-
nine percent of the workers employed in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, remittances 
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sent to Pakistan amounted to roughly $2 to $2.5 billion while petroleum imports 
cost the Pakistanis approximately $1.45 billion.76 
By 1981, Pakistan had military contingents in 22 countries — though 
primarily in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Syria and Libya— 
and was, with the exception of Cuba, the leading supplier of military personnel 
in the Third World. This policy was in part necessitated by the American arms 
embargoes of 1965 and 1971, and it enabled Pakistan to finance military 
purchases. (It should be noted that since the 1965 embargo, Pakistan has built 
up an indigenous arms industry with the help of the Chinese and the French, who 
have also provided or sold the Pakistanis tanks and aircraft, respectively; and 
Pakistan has the capacity to rebuild or reconstruct those tanks and aircraft.)77 In 
both Libya and the UAE, Pakistanis have been contracted to maintain and fly 
airplanes for these countries' respective air forces while the two Arab states and 
Saudi Arabia have funded arms purchases, including French Mirage aircraft and 
American Cobra helicopters. In addition, it was reported in 1983 that the Saudis 
were providing Pakistan with $1 billion in economic assistance annually. In 
Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani presence had been, until the 1991 Gulf War, the 
largest of any foreign military in the Arab world; it includes providing services 
for the Saudi army, national guard and palace guard. Estimates of Pakistani 
military personnel in Saudi Arabia vary; during the 1980s, it may have been 
about 20,000 while during the Gulf War the official figure was 11,000.78 
Pakistan is now dependent greatly on Saudi largess, which, as with its on 
again, off again American connection, comes with political strings attached. 
Recently, the Pakistanis were made fully aware of this with their equivocal stand 
during the Gulf War. General Mirza Aslam Beg, the Pakistani army chief of staff 
at the time, split with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif and openly supported Iraq while, due to internal Pakistani opposition to 
American involvement in the war, Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia were far 
from the frontlines. Even though Pakistan faced a serious economic crisis at the 
time, no Arab financial assistance was forthcoming.79 
CONCLUSION 
This article focuses primarily on a thirty year period in which Pakistan's 
foreign policy objectives have remained constant. Indeed, such is still the case 
of Pakistani policy today. However, Pakistan has, during its rather brief history, 
shifted in its foreign policy from nonalignment to being part of the Western 
alliance, to emphasis on "bilateralism." All during this time, it has sought 
Islamic unity. By 1971, Pakistan may have lost its eastern wing, but it was 
finally able to gain, through the efforts of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the acceptance of 
the Muslim world and to benefit in terms of identity and security from these 
relations. 
While Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 and executed two years later, his 
cultivation of close Pakistani-Middle Eastern ties would be his legacy to 
Pakistan. However, these relations, while important, have not alone provided 
the answers to Pakistan's problems of trying to insure its political and economic 
security as well as finding the proper means of providing a strong sense of 
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national identity. The Pakistani government has to resolve its on again, off again 
dispute with the United States over its nuclear program, while it must work 
together with the Indians to solve once and for all the most long-standing of their 
problems—the issue of Kashmir. To say the least, these are not easy tasks, but 
they are necessary for Pakistan to truly feel secure from external threats. 
Moreover, Pakistan has to maintain a democratic process domestically that will, 
over time, bridge ethnic differences and help to establish a Pakistani national 
identity that will not be based solely on its citizenry sharing a common religion. 
According to Anwar Hussain Syed in his masterful work, Pakistan: 
Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity, only through democracy can Pakistan 
achieve national solidarity. The case of Yugoslavia has shown that unity cannot 
be forced. Neither can it be based solely on ideology as the demise of the Soviet 
Union has proven. Islamic institutions and relations with the Muslim world may 
be important for Pakistan's well-being politically, psychologically and/or 
economically, but it cannot guarantee the survival of the Pakistani state—a state 
with four distinct ethnic regions. 
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